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In The Supreme Court
of_ ,the State

of-

LYNDA M. JENNINGS,
Plaintiff artd Appellil,nt,
vs.

-Case No. ,

12171

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the decision of the Third

Iudicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, presiding, which affirmed the Order issued by the defendant April 29, 1970, effective May 14, 1970, as
the result of an accident occurred on March 16,
1970, which required the plaintiM in the alternative
either to suffer suspension of her driver's license
or post security in the amount of $241.00. The Order
was affirmed on the grounds that the defendant did

not abuse his discre-fion in issuing the said Order.
The plaintiff appellant would contend that this decision was in error as a result of the failure. of the
District Court to afford her a hearing on the question of her culpability in this matter that would accord with the procedural requirements of Due
Process of Law in the conduct of the said hearing
and would request this Court to reverse .the
ment of the· District Court and to remand this matter
for a hearing which.is in accord with the procedural
requirements cf Due Process of Law.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The plaintiff-appellant, Lynda M. Jennings, was
involved in a two-car automobile accident on or
about March 16, 1970, at 253 Center Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah (Tr. 18,
This accident was investigated
by Offker William C. Duncan of the Salt
Lake City Police Department who duly filed a report
thereof with the defendant (Exhibit 3-D). Reports
on the accident were also filed by the plaintiff and
the driver of the other car, Brigham J. Young,
within five days follovving . . the accident .
hibit 3-D). The dama.g& to the automobile driven
by Brigham J. Young was estimated· to exceed
$100.00 (Exhib1t 3-D), and the plaintiff did not own,
at the time of the accident, an auto!Ilobile liability
insuF.mce policy (Tr. 25, Exhibit 3-D). Based on these
accident reports, the defendant determined that the
plaintiff would be required to either post security
in the ainount of $241.00 or sU:ffer the suspension
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0£ her driver's license (Tr. 27-28) and issued an Order dated April 29, 1970, effective May 14, 1970
(Exhibit 2-D). Thereafter, on the 12th day of May,
1970, by Order of the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County signed by Gordon R.
Hall, the Order of the defendant was stayed and the
defendant was ordered to show cause why the stay
of said Order should not be made permanent (R.
7-9). A hearing on this matter was held before the
Honorable D. Frank Wilkins on May 22, 1970, as
pa.rt of the Law in Motion calendar for said day, at
which time the plaintiff submitted that she was entitled to a full hearing in which she could
present all witnesses that were necessary to
a proper hearing of this matter (Tr. 18-23, 30). The
defendant maintained that a hearing should be
held only by reviewing the reports submitted to
the defendant and that although other witnesses could be called by the plaintiff, they were
not necessary since the alleged sole question involved was one of whether or not the defendant
abused his discretion (Tr. 15, 17, 19, 21). It was pointed out to the Court by the plaintiff that she had
nowhere in the proceedings had any type of formal
hearing with an opportunity to present or subpoena
witnesses in her behalf or to cross-examine other
witnesses (Tr. 20, 21). After examining the reports,
hearing the testimony 0£ plaintiff Lynda M. Jennings (Tr. 17, 23-26), and defendant Jack C. Mahoney
(Tr. 27, 28), and permitting a proffer of proof by the
plaintiff (Tr. 30), the Court, although conceding the
importance to the plaintiff of having Officer Duncan ·
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present (Tr. 29), denied the plaintiff's Motion for
Continuance to bring him before the Court and upheld the Order of Suspension (Tr. 30) over the objection of the plaintiff that this procedure violated
the plaintiffs right to procedural Due Process of Law
by not allowing her a hearing in accord with those
constitutionally protected rights (Tr. 20-22, 29-30). A
judgment was subsequently entered on the 8th day
of June, 1970 (R. 20), but this judgment was stayed
on appeal (Tr. 30-31) by an Order of the Court entered on the 1st Clay ofJuly, 1970 (R. 21-22).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
At a hearing on May 22, 1970, before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Order issued by the defendant on April
29, 1970, effective May 14, 1970, requiring in the
alternative either the posting of a bond in the sum
of $241.00, or the suspension of the plaintiff's driver's license was affirmed and enforced by the Court
in a judgment entered on June 8, 1970, which was
then stayed pending this appeal by an Order entered on July 1st, 1970.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The pla_intiff requests this Court to find the hearing held before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins,
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on May 22, 1970,
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failed to provide to the plaintiff a hearing that was
in accord with the requirements of procedural Due
Process of Law as guaranteed by Article I, Section
7, of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, to order the
'
:reversal of the decision· entered as a result of that
hearing and to remand this matter for a further hearon the merits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A HEARING,
WHICH ACCORDS WITH THE FULL REQUIREMENTS
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BEFORE HER DRIVER'S
LICENSE MAY BE SUSPENDED UNDER THE UTAH
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT, TITLE 41, CHAPTER 12, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.

Section 41-12-2(b), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
states:
'' ( b) " Any person aggrieved by an order or
act of the commission, may, within ten days
after notice thereof, file a petition in the dis.trict court for a review thereof; but the filing
of such petition shall not suspend the order or
act unless a stay thereof shall be allowed by
a judge of said court pending final determination of the review. The court shall swnmarily
hear the petition and may make any appro- .
priate order or decree."

This provision was held by this Court in Hague v. State

of Utah, 23 Utah 2d 299, 462 P.2d 418 (1969), to mean

·that the District Court has jurisdiction to review the
·Order· of the Director of Financial Responsibility
Division requiring i:p the alternative the posting of
. security or the suffering of suspension of driver's
. license _and to determine whether "or not the person who is the subject of such an Order is at fault
at the time of the collision. To make that determination, it is now submitted by the plaintiff that the
hearing held before the District Court must be one
that accords with the minimum procedural protections of law provided by Article I, Section 7, of the
Constitution of the State of Utah and the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States of America, Due Process of Law. This
is required due to the fact that no administrative
hearing is held and the recipient of such an order
has no chance to have such a hearing before the
administrative agency prior to review by the District Court.
The provisions of Article I, Section 7, of the
Constitution of the State of Utah were interpreted
by this Court in the case of Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 6 Utah 253, 21 Pac. 994, 4 ALR 724 (1889),
to mean that a person was entitled to _have an
portunity to have his day in court. In the course of
this opinion, this Court traced the history of this
constitutional concept back to the common origin
of that with the Due Process of Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and fourteenth Amendment to the Con-

op-
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stitution of the United States of America. Then, in
Toiman v. Salt Lake County, 21 Utah 2d 31_0, 437 P.2d 442
(1968), and Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County,
89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1936), this Court adopted,
in interpretation of Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah, the definition of Due
Process of Law, "day in court", articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 ·U.S. 545, 14 L.Ed.2d 62, 85 S Ct. 1187 (1965),
wherein the United States Supreme Court had
quoted the definition which had been articulated in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306,
94 L.Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950):
"Many controversies have raged about the
cryptic and abstract words of the due process
clause but there can be no doubt that at a
minimum they require that deprivation of life,
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case." 339
U.S. a.t 313, _94 L. Ed. at 872, 70 S.Ct. 652.

Expansion of this concept in the area of the instant
matter are two recent cases recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court, Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corporation of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 23 L.Ed. 349, 89
S.Ct. 1820 09S9), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S ......... ,
25 L.Ed.2d. 287, 90 S.Ct. ........ (1970). In the Sniatlach
matter, the United States Supreme Court held that

8

one's wages, ie., property, could not be taken
absent notice and a prior hearing. In the instant
matter, it would be submitted that there was sufficient notice and there was a prior hearing. However, as held by the Supreme Court, the prior hearing must be one that complies with the procedural
requirements of Due Process of Law and such a
hearinq was not had in the instant matter.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, Mr. Justice Brennan,
delivering the opinion of the Court, stated in regard
to the requfrements of a Due Process hearing:
"'The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.'
Grannis v. Ordfan, 234 US 385, 394, 58 L Ed
136?., 1369, 34 S Ct 779 (1914). The hearing
must be 'cit a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 US
515, 552, 14 L Ed 2d 62, 66, 85 S Ct 1187
(1965). In the present context these principles
require that a recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination and an effective opportunity
tu defend by confronting any adverse witnesses
and by jJresenting his own arguments and evidence oral! y. These rights are important in
cases .such as those before us, where recipients
have challenged proposed terminations as resting on incorrect or misleading factual premises
or on misapplication of rules or policies tO the
facts of particular cases.
The opportunity to be heard must be
tc:..ilored to the capacities and circumstances
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of those who are to be heard .... " 397 U.S. at
........ , 25 L.Ed. 2d at 299. (Emphasis added)

The Court went on to state:
"In almost every setting where important
decisions turn on question of fact, due process
requires an opportunity to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses. E. g., ICC v. Louis- .
ville & N.R.R. Co. 227 US 88, 93-94, 57 L Ed
431, 434, 33 S Ct 185 (HH3); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 US 96,
103-104, 10 L Ed 2d 224, 229, 230, 83 S Ct
1175, 2 ALR3d 1254 (1963). What \Ve said in
Greene v. McElroy, 360 US 474, 496-497, 3 L
Ed 2d 1377, 1390, 1391, 79 S Ct 1400 (19f59),
is ·particularly pertinent here:
'Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these
is that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness
of the action depends on fact findings, the
evidence used to prove the Government's case
must be disclosed to the individual so that he
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important
where evidence concists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or
who, in fact, might be perjurors or persons
motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized
these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have
ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth
Amendment .... This Court has been zealous
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to protect these rights from erosion. It has
spoken out not only in criminal. cases, ... but

also in all types of cases ii/here adniinistrative ...
actions were under scrutiny.' " (Emphasis

added)

Applying these principles to the instant case,
it is quite clear that one challenging the Order of
Suspension of the Department of Public Safety must
be allowed to bring in all necessary witnesses and
have a hearing at which these may be presented
before an Order is to be sustained. This is in accord
with the requirements of Due Process of Law which
require that one be given the chance to be heard,
to subpoena witnesses and to cross-examine witnesses presented against one's own interests. This
was effectively denied to Lhe plaintiff by not permitting her to have an administrative hearing, by the
placing of her matter on the Law in Motion Calendar,
by the action of defendant's attorneys who indicated
before the hearing that their position was that no witnesses could testify and their refusal to ha.ve the
matter placed on the trial calendar (Tr. 15-16), and
by the Court who denied plaintiff's request for a
continuance so as to have time to subpoena witnesses in her own behalf when advised of these
matters (Tr. 30). This denial of the right to present
her witness was not only contrary to the general
requirements of Due Process of Law, it was contrary
to the specific holding of this Court in a collateral
but obviously analagous area of the suspension of
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a driver's license by the Department of Public Safety, pursuant to the provisions of Title 41, Chapter
2, Utah Code Annotated 19531 where this Court so
required, stating:
"We feel, and so hold, that the court- was.'
required to take testimony., ex:amine into the
facts, and make its own
·
mination as to whether the appellant .was·..
habitually a negligent driver, and whether bis
driver's license should be suspended.
For the guidance -of the Department of
Public Safety, we observe that if there is a _
request by a suspended driver, he should .bave ·
the privilege of having witnesses subpoenaed
in conon his own behalf. The
ducting its hearings, should substantially
ply with the fundamental rules· of due process
in legal proceedings, even though all of the
particular formalities required in court proceedings need not be met." McAnerney v. State,
9 Utah 2d 191, 194, 341 P.2d 212, 214 (1959).

Plaintiffs would submit thgt although there is
no provision for a trial de novo ip. the FinariCial Be.:sponsibili ty provisions, Sections 41-12-1, et.seq., Utah
Code Annotated 1953, the hearing before the
trict Court must be treated as though it were a· frial'
de novo because at no point fri the administrative'
proceedings prior to that
_in the ·District
Court is there any provision for any
Accordingly, if the provisions of the Financial Responsibility statutes, Sectons 41-12-1, et seq., Utah Code
Annotated 1953, are to be
so ai;; t6 be
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.

constitutional, that is, in accord with the requirements of Due Process of Law, the hearing held in
the District Court must be considered as a trial d9
novo and all of the procedural protections u.nder
the descriptive phrase, Due Process of Law, as summarized. herein, must be accorded to the plaintiff.
These were·. denied to. the plaintiff in the instant
matter by the £ailure·of the Court to permit her time
within vv;hich to call the witnesses she wished to
present _in her own behalf, which itself was a result of the defendant's insistance that this matter be
heard on the Law of Motion Calendar, rather than
receiving a trial setting., The Trial Court compounded
this denial of plaintiff's right to present her evidence
for consideration by deciding this case solely on
the written records submitted to the Court by the
defendant. This procedure denied her those procedural protections to these rights that are summarized in the phrase, Due Process of L_aw, as set forth
above. d. Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d

314 (1945).

Accordingly, this Court should reverse the
Judgment of the District Court and remand this matter to that Court for a hearing on the merits and order that the hearing so held should be one that is
held in accord with the procedural requirements
incorporated in the phrase, Due Process of Law.
CONCLUSION
The hearing held in the District Court in the
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instant matter having failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Due Process of Law and
the plaintiff· having been granted no· hearing at
which it complied with the said requirements of.
Due Process.of Law, this Court should reverse the.
judgment 6f the District Court and remand this matter for a £urther hearing on the merits, which hearing must be held in accordance with the provisions
of procedural Due Process of Law.
Respectfully Submitted,

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
-Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

